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Elul  (2009)  compares  the  repayment  performance  of  securitized  residential  mortgages  to  those 
retained in portfolio, for loans originated during 2003 through 2007.  The analysis controls for various 
loan‐level factors, including the initial loan‐to‐value ratio and the borrower’s credit score at origination, 
and  for  local  economic  conditions,  including  house‐price  appreciation.  The  analysis  indicates  that 
nonagency prime, adjustable rate securitized loans originated after 2003 (and fixed rate loans originated 
after 2005) performed significantly worse than similar, nonsecuritized, loans.  According to Elul, the 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Stages of Sample 
Development 
2005 2006 
        
1.  Initial HMDA sample
1  1,404,749 1,289,036 
2.  HMDA Exclusions       
      (a) Nondepository institution
2 (1,063,743) (891,255) 
      (b) Sold to affiliate or depository  (43,453)  (48,114) 
      (c) Other exclusions
3 (17,160)  (2,984) 
      (c) Remaining  280,393   346,683  
3.  Merge to LoanPerformance       
     TrueStandings Data
4            
      Missing data       
       (a) Large institutions  (22,853) (31,426) 
       (b) Small institutions  (18,588) (21,590) 
4.  Remaining  238,952   293,667  
      (a) Large institutions  181,101   230,090  
      (b) Small institutions  57,851   63,577  
5.  Percent securitized exclusions       
     Large institutions only       
      (a) Sold < 5% or Sold >90%  (121,888)  (120,311) 
      (b) Remaining  59,213   109,779  
6.  Missing income       
     (a) Large institutions  (4,366) (7,365) 
     (b) Small institutions  (4,792) (5,763) 
7.  Final Sample:  Model 1 with 
Fixed Effects
5 
     
    Large institutions
6       
      (a) Observations read  54,847   102,414  
      (b) Observations used  54,798   102,239  
      (c) Total securitized  25,007   58,474  
      Small institutions       
      (d) Observations read  53,059   57,814  
      (e) Observations used  53,026   57,631  
      (f) Total securitized  10,128   11,495  
        
8.  Final Sample:  Model 2 without 
Fixed Effects
5 
     
       Large institutions
6       
         (a) Observations read  54,847   102,414  
         (b) Observations used  54,847   102,414  
             (c) Total securitized  25,024   58,587  
       Small institutions       
         (a) Observations read  53,059   57,814  
         (b) Observations used  53,051   57,687  
             (c) Total securitized  10,141   11,513  




















2005     2006 
mean median      mean  median 
Loan amount   Retained  90.99  56.00     109.72  70.00 
   Securitized  150.66  122.00     172.16  138.00 
                    
APR spread   Retained  4.42  4.01     4.33  3.91 
   Securitized  4.22  3.86     4.04  3.57 
                    
Future delinquency rate in census tract  Retained  15.4%  14.9%     15.8%  15.0% 
   Securitized  17.4%  16.6%     17.2%  16.4% 
                    
Tract pct second lien   Retained  20.7%  20.0%    20.7%  20.0% 
   Securitized  30.0%  32.0%     30.1%  31.3% 
                    
Tract pct FICO< 620  Retained  53.0%  53.1%     54.6%  55.3% 
   Securitized  47.8%  48.1%     49.5%  50.3% 
                    
Tract pct LTV > 90   Retained  19.2%  18.2%     22.7%  22.2% 
   Securitized  17.1%  16.1%     20.4%  19.1% 
                    
Tract pct subprime specialist   Retained  43.7%  44.9%    32.7%  33.3% 
   Securitized  53.5%  54.8%     38.5%  39.0% 
                    
Tract pct high cost   Retained  32.7%  31.0%    34.6%  33.2% 
   Securitized  31.7%  29.2%     33.8%  31.8% 
                    
Loan-to-income ratio   Retained  1.42  1.09     1.52  1.22 
   Securitized  2.19  2.17     2.13  2.12 
                    
Log of census tract owner-occupied units  Retained  7.24  7.29     7.23  7.29 
   Securitized  7.16  7.21     7.16  7.22 
              
Local area house-price appreciation rate Retained  9.9%  7.4%      6.5%  6.0% 
   Securitized  12.8%  8.7%     6.6%  6.4% 
                    
Local area pct change in housing starts   Retained  7.8%  5.7%     -8.9%  -9.3% 










2005     2006 
mean median      mean  median 
Loan amount   Retained  167.61  129.00     204.94  159.00 
   Securitized  203.74  159.00     203.43  165.00 
                    
APR spread   Retained  4.44  4.17     4.49  4.04 
   Securitized  4.81  4.84     5.06  5.11 
                    
Future delinquency rate in census tract  Retained  17.9%  17.3%     18.2%  17.5% 
   Securitized  19.4%  19.0%     19.2%  18.6% 
                    
Tract pct second lien   Retained  28.5%  30.8%    29.6%  31.3% 
   Securitized  33.2%  36.0%     32.9%  35.2% 
                    
Tract pct FICO< 620  Retained                
   Securitized                
              
Tract pct LTV > 90   Retained  16.6%  15.5%     19.0%  17.4% 
   Securitized  14.8%  13.7%     18.5%  16.8% 
                    
Tract pct subprime specialist   Retained  53.9%  55.4%    39.3%  39.8% 
   Securitized  59.3%  60.6%     43.4%  43.8% 
                    
Tract pct high cost   Retained  31.9%  29.3%    34.5%  32.3% 
   Securitized  32.8%  30.6%     37.5%  35.7% 
                    
Loan-to-income ratio   Retained  2.18  2.15     2.16  2.13 
   Securitized  2.72  2.72     2.43  2.47 
                    
Log of census tract owner-occupied units  Retained  7.14  7.21     7.15  7.23 
   Securitized  7.10  7.17     7.07  7.15 
              
Local area house-price appreciation rate Retained  13.6%  10.4%      6.7%  6.4% 
   Securitized  14.0%  12.1%     6.2%  6.1% 
                    
Local area pct change in housing starts   Retained 6.5%  4.8%      -12.2%  -11.7% 






Panel A: Banks with assets < 10 billion 
 
Variable value
 Frequencies   % Sold 
 y2005    y2006    y2005    y2006  
Indicator for loan sale  0  76.7% 76.2% 0.0%  0.0%
   1  23.3% 23.8% 100.0%  100.0%
              
Insufficient data for measuring 
delinquency rate   0  97.8% 98.5% 23.6%  24.0%
   1  2.2% 1.5% 10.8%  13.1%
                 
Bank has branch in county of origination 0  12.7% 10.8% 33.1%  35.6%
   1  87.3% 89.2% 21.9%  22.4%
                 
Non-owner-occupied property 0  73.8% 72.5% 25.7%  26.0%
   1  26.2% 27.5% 16.7%  18.0%
                 
Insufficient data for measuring LTV   0  99.8% 99.7% 23.4%  23.8%
   1  0.2% 0.3% 11.7%  15.4%
                 
Metropolitan area indicator  0  23.2% 23.2% 13.4%  14.0%
   1  76.8% 76.8% 26.4%  26.8%
                 
HUD subprime specialist   0  96.9% 97.7% 22.4%  23.3%
   1  3.1% 2.3% 54.4%  46.4%
                 
OCC-regulated banks  1  22.9% 24.5% 25.7%  27.8%
FRB 2  11.8% 9.7% 34.2%  29.3%
FDIC 3  41.8% 43.1% 9.1%  13.6%
OTS 4  18.4% 18.4% 46.9%  39.9%
                 
Thrift institution  0  77.8% 77.2% 18.1%  19.9%
   1  22.2% 22.8% 41.7%  37.0%




Panel B: Banks with assets > 10 billion 
Variable value
 Frequencies   % Sold 
 y2005    y2006    y2005    y2006  
Indicator for loan sale  0  19.8% 30.6% 0.0%  0.0%
   1  80.2% 69.4% 100.0%  100.0%
              
Insufficient data for measuring 
delinquency rate   0  271.7% 214.5% 80.2%  69.4%
   1  2.0% 1.1% 70.5%  56.7%
                 
Bank has branch in county of origination 0  77.0% 49.9% 79.7%  68.2%
   1  196.7% 165.7% 80.3%  69.7%
                 
Non-owner-occupied property 0  239.0% 171.1% 82.3%  71.2%
   1  34.7% 44.5% 65.4%  62.4%
                 
Insufficient data for measuring LTV   0  273.6% 215.4% 80.2%  69.4%
   1  0.2% 0.3% 69.5%  56.5%
                 
Metropolitan area indicator  0  24.2% 21.2% 67.2%  58.0%
   1  249.6% 194.4% 81.4%  70.6%
                 
HUD subprime specialist   0  271.8% 214.2% 80.1%  69.3%
   1  1.9% 1.4% 97.0%  82.4%
                 
OCC-regulated banks  1  142.4% 77.8% 77.3%  64.0%
FRB 2  5.1% 7.8% 31.9%  39.5%
FDIC 3  99.4% 66.7% 90.5%  84.3%
OTS 4  26.8% 63.2% 66.3%  63.9%
                 
Thrift institution  0  149.4% 88.8% 74.9%  60.0%
   1  124.3% 126.8% 86.5%  75.9%





Panel A: Depository institutions with assets less than $10 billion 
Dependent Variable: Subprime loan was sold (1,0) 
 
Variable  Description           
      2005     2006  








Specialist   Lender is subprime specialist    0.29 61.7*    0.05 67.7* 
OCC1  Lender is a national bank    0.86  0.6    0.84  7.3* 
FRB1  Lender is state-chartered bank and member of the 
Federal Reserve System 
0.93 2.7    0.76 0.7 
FDIC1  Lender is a state-chartered nonmember bank    0.42  910.8*    0.47  532.8* 
OTS1  Lender is an S&L     1.54  103.3*    0.96  20.2* 
Thrift   Thrift institution indicator     1.41  27.0*    1.58  71.7* 
Tract % high cost  Fraction of tract loans that are high cost     2.70  96.3*    3.70  185.8* 
Specialist rate0  Lender is subprime specialist; loan not high cost    8.35  35.1*    44.28  47.9* 
Rate1  APR spread in [3.0, 3.25)    1.72  48.3*    2.34  170.5* 
Rate2  APR spread in (3.25,5.25]    1.39  20.0*    1.67  67.2* 
Rate3  APR spread in (5.25,7.0]    1.27  9.3*    1.75  63.7* 
Investor  Loan for nonprimary residence    0.79  52.0*    0.71  138.7* 
Loan-to-income ratio  Ratio of loan amount to borrower income    1.17  145.9*    1.09  47.9* 
Log owner units  Log of census tract owner-occupied units     0.71  218.7*    0.79  134.5* 
Lnsize1  Loan amount < $55,000    0.45  188.0*    0.40  327.6* 
Lnsize2  Loan amount in [$55,000, $155,000)    1.10  4.0**    1.00  0.0 
Lnsize3  Loan amount in [$155,000, 255,000)    1.21  13.7*    1.07  2.8 
Metro  Property in an MSA    1.08  4.7**    1.14  15.9* 
Branch  Indicator for loan originated in county where bank 
has a branch 
0.70 99.2*    0.66  145.8* 
Log assets  Log of institution total assets    1.24  540.5*    1.24  518.2* 
Tract % second   Fraction of tract's high cost home purchase loans 
that are 2nd lien 
18.56 489.1*  32.21 834.7* 
Tract % Specialist  Subprime specialist share of subprime loans in tract  5.07  204.1*    2.79  84.4* 
% LTV GT 90  Fraction of  census tract's subprime home purchase 
loans with LTV ³ 90 
3.99 78.8*    4.42  133.8* 
LTV Dummy  Insufficient data for measuring LTV distribution    1.32  0.5    1.87  7.1* 
% Low FICO  Fraction of census tract's subprime home purchase 
loans with FICO < 620 
0.92 0.5    0.82 3.6 
HPI change  Annual rate of change in local area HPI in year     1.81  11.7*    8.47  46.6* 
MSASTARTS  Annual rate of change in local area housing starts in 
year 
0.33 170.6*   1.09  1.2 
             
Sample  Size       52,781    56,021 
C  statistics       0.819     0.783 
* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level             




Panel B: Depository institutions with assets greater than $10 billion 
Dependent Variable: Subprime loan was securitized (1,0) 
 
Variable Description    2005      2006   








Tract % high cost  Fraction of loans in census tract that are high cost    2.44  134.4*    1.83  100.0* 
Rate1  APR spread in [3.0, 3.25)    7.57  486.3*    2.09  262.7* 
Rate2  APR spread in [3.25, 5.25)    5.67  377.1*    1.59  120.3* 
Rate3  APR spread in [5.25, 7.0)    3.24  166.7*    1.54  101.7* 
Investor  Loan indicator for nonprimary residence    1.43  146.8*    1.33  158.5* 
Loan-to-income ratio  Ratio (loan-level) created by dividing loan amount by 
income 
1.18 210.2*    1.09  94.3* 
Log owner units  Natural log of census tract owner-occupied units    0.94  13.1*    0.97  5.0** 
Loan size1  Loan size (0, 55K]    2.49  333.5*    1.96  324.0* 
Loan size2  Loan size (55, 155K]    2.78  744.6*    2.31  1100.1* 
Loan size3  Loan size (155, 255K]    1.93  328.5*    1.70  540.9* 
Metro   Metro area loan indicator    1.11  12.8*    1.19  52.4* 
Branch  Indicator for county where bank has a branch    0.98  0.7    1.02  1.4 
Tract % Second  Percent of 2nd liens in  census tract    0.99  0.0    1.78  51.2* 
Tract % Specialist  Percent of HUD subprime specialists in the census tract  1.48  17.5*    1.57  35.5* 
% LTV GT 90  Fraction of subprime home purchase loans in the census 
tract with LTV greater than 90% 
2.46 46.4*    2.17 68.3* 
LTV dummy  Insufficient data for estimating LTV distribution    1.38  1.3    1.02  0.0 
% Low Fico  Fraction of subprime home purchase loans in the census 
tract with FICO less than 620 
1.24 4.9**    0.62 46.2* 
HPI change  Annual house-price rate of change for given year    0.39  55.6*    0.38  24.2* 
MSA Housing starts  Annual housing starts rate of change for the metropolitan 
area in  given year 
0.86 5.2**    1.23 14.6* 
             
Sample Size       52,042     91,882 
C statistics       0.754     0.714 
* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level             





Panel A: Depository institutions with assets less than $10 billion 
Dependent Variable: Subprime loan was sold (1,0) 
Variable  Description           
      2005     2006  








Specialist   Lender is subprime specialist    0.42 31.5*    0.07 56.9* 
OCC1  Lender is a national bank    0.80  0.41    0.85  41.7* 
FRB1  Lender is state-chartered bank and member of the 
Federal Reserve System 
0.94 17.9*    0.66 6.2** 
FDIC1  Lender is  state-chartered nonmember bank    0.36  1117.4*    0.41  699.8* 
OTS1  Lender is an S&L     1.30  74.7*    0.84  11.7* 
Thrift  Thrift institution indicator    1.65  60.3*    1.73  109.2* 
Branch  Indicator for loan originated in county where bank 
has a branch 
0.71 101.0*   0.68 132.2* 
Specialist rate0  Lender is subprime specialist; loan not high cost     8.81  38.8*    31.1  40.5* 
Rate1  APR spread in [3.0, 3.25)    1.71  47.8*    1.83  91.8* 
Rate2  APR spread in (3.25,5.25]    1.41  22.0*    1.31  19.6* 
Rate3  APR spread in (5.25,7.0]    1.35  14.5*    1.47  31.6* 
Log assets  Log of institution total assets    1.27  671.6*    1.26  614.3* 
Investor  Loan for nonprimary residence    0.86  20.9*    0.78  71.7* 
Loan-to-income ratio  Ratio of loan amount to borrower income    1.20  216.8*    1.11  78.5* 
Lnsize1  Loan amount < $55,000    0.37  334.0*    0.32  572.3* 
Lnsize2  Loan amount in [$55,000, $155,000)    1.02  0.2    0.89  9.6* 
Lnsize3  Loan amount in [$155,000, 255,000)    1.18  11.5*    1.02  0.2 
Metro  Property in an MSA    1.49  142.5*    1.53  190.4* 
HPI change  Annual rate of change in local area HPI in year     2.76  43.8*    15.75  85.1* 
MSASTARTS  Annual rate of change in local area housing starts in 
year 
0.34 180.9*   0.78  10.1* 
Tract % Bad  Subprime 90+ delinquency rate in census tract as of 
Jan. 2008 
3.19 35.1*    1.84 10.6* 
Bad rate dummy  Insufficient data for measuring tract delinquency rate  0.72  8.5*    0.83  2.5 
             
Sample  Size       52,806    56,077 
C  statistics       0.800     0.761 
* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level             





Panel B: Depository institutions with assets greater than $10 billion 
Dependent Variable: Subprime loan was sold (1,0) 
 
Variable Description    2005      2006   








Branch  Bank has a branch in county were loan was originated  0.99  0.28    1.02  1.3 
Rate1  APR spread in [3.0, 3.25)    7.18  464.1*    2.07  260.3* 
Rate2  APR spread in [3.25, 5.25)    5.46  362.7*    1.58  120.1* 
Rate3  APR spread in [5.25, 7.0)    3.17  161.6*    1.55  105.8* 
Investor  Loan indicator for nonprimary residence    1.47  171.1*    1.34  173.3* 
Loan-to-income ratio  Ratio (loan-level) created by dividing loan amount by 
income 
1.19 228.3*    1.10 120.5* 
Loan size1  Loan size (0, 55K]    3.33  705.4*    2.04  468.6* 
Loan size2  Loan size (55, 155K]    3.36  1200.7*    2.36  1491.5* 
Loan size3  Loan size (155, 255K]    2.09  432.1*    1.71  580.3* 
Metro   Metro area loan indicator    1.15  22.1*    1.27  105.6* 
HPI change  Annual house-price rate of change for given year    0.27  131.5*    0.50  12.5* 
MSA Housing starts  Annual housing starts rate of change for the metropolitan 
area in given year 
0.89 3.1    1.19  9.9* 
Tract % bad  Subprime  90+ days delinquent in  census tract as of Jan. 
2008 
1.76 13.0*    1.72 18.9* 
Bad rate dummy  Insufficient data for measuring delinquency rate    0.88  1.6    0.86  2.7 
             
Sample Size       52,090     92,052 
C statistics       0.749     0.709 
* Statistically significant at the 1 percent level             

























Figure 1: MBS Yield vs. 10-Year Treasury Yield
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Figure 3: Optimal Rate of Securitization
alpha=0.75
alpha =min(q+0.20, 0.75) 
alpha= 1-q+0.75*q**2
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 Figure 5: Disposition of Subprime Loans (purchaser type) 
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Figure 8: Mean APR spread for high‐cost loans by type of 
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Figure 9: Percent of loans for nonprimary residence 
by type of institution
Subprime 
specialist
Non‐specialist 
non‐depository
Large depository
Small depository
 
  
44 
   
‐15.0%
‐10.0%
‐5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
2004 2005 2006
Figure 10: Housing market variables
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Figure 11:  Product mix
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Figure 12: Documentation level, LTV, and FICO
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Figure 13: Subprime piggyback percentage
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Appendix 1: Derivation of Propositions 1 and 2 
To verify Proposition 1, let F(x, a1, b1) and F(x, a2, b2) be two beta distributions with identical 
medians x
m.  Then F(x, a1, b1) and F(x, a2, b2) intersect at x=0, where F(x, a1, b1)=F(x, a2, b2)=0; at x=1, 
where F(x, a1, b1)=F(x, a2, b2)=1; and at x= x
m, where F(x, a1, b1)=F(x, a2, b2)=1/2.  Next, we show that 
these are the only points at which the two distributions will intersect. 
The beta distribution is defined as F(x, a, b)=B(x, a, b)/B(0, a, b), where B(x, a, b) is the beta function.  
Calculating the second derivative of the beta distribution, we obtain: 
(A‐1) ∂
2F/∂x
2= [(a‐1)x
a‐2(1‐x)
b‐1 – (b‐1)x
a‐1(1‐x)
b‐2]/B(x, a, b) 
It follows that: 
  (A‐2) ∂
2F/∂x
2 > (=) (<) 0 if and only if [(a‐1)(1‐x) – (b‐1)x] > (=) (<) 0. 
Hence, there can be at most one x0 such that ∂
2F/∂x
2= 0; i.e., at most one inflection point of the 
distribution, implying that any two beta distributions can intersect at most once in (0, 1).  It follows that 
if F(x, a1, b1) and F(x, a2, b2) intersect at a common median value x
m, then either F(x, a1, b1) > F(x, a2, b2) 
for all x < x
m, or vice versa.  It then follows immediately that F(x, a1, b1) > F(x, a2, b2) for all x < x
m if and 
only if F(x, a1, b1) has the wider interquartile range.   
To verify Proposition 2, let F(x, a1, b1) and F(x, a2, b2) be two beta distributions.  From (A‐2), if ai < 1 
and bi ≥ 1 for i=1 and 2, then the distributions are strictly concave; if ai ≥ 1 and bi < 1 for i=1 and 2 they 
are strictly convex.  In either case, the distributions will intersect only at 0 and 1, from which it follows 
that F(x, a1, b1) > F(x, a2, b2) for all x in (0, 1) if and only if F(x, a1, b1) has the wider interquartile range.   
 
 